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Safety standardsResidential rooﬁng is a high risk occupation, more than nine times as risky as the average occupation and
more than three times as risky as the average construction trade. To better understand the factors
involved in residential rooﬁng fatalities, 112 case reports ﬁled by Occupational Safety and Health inves-
tigators for the years 2005–2010 were examined. In almost all of the recorded cases there was no adher-
ence to the then current safety standards. It was found that there was little or no appropriate use of fall
protection practices or equipment and that employer planning and employee training was minimal. Spe-
ciﬁc standards violated were examined as well as the monetary penalties assessed. In addition to an
increase in the size of the penalties, it is hoped the recent national program ‘‘Campaign to Prevent Falls
in Construction’’, with its emphasis on planning, needed equipment, and training will prove fruitful in
mitigating falls from roofs.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Since 1971, the major goal of the United States Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has been to reduce work-
place injuries and fatalities. While overall there has been consider-
able success in this endeavor, there have also been areas of
disappointment. One area which has experienced limited improve-
ment in fatality reduction is residential rooﬁng. Here we will
examine the residential rooﬁng industry and the factors associated
with rooﬁng fatalities in an effort to better understand the issues
and challenges it faces in reducing this statistic.
The ﬁrst decade of this century saw signiﬁcant progress in the
reduction of occupational construction fatalities from a total of
1154 in 2000 to a total of 774 in 2010. While the reduction in fatal-
ities is to be welcomed, it should be noted that some of the 33%
reduction in fatalities was accompanied by an 18.7% reduction in
construction industry employment. Indeed, the decade embraces
two quite opposite periods. During the ﬁrst of these sub-periods,
to 2006, employment peaked at 7,691,000 a 13.3% increase from
2000, but fatalities also increased by 7.4%. This represented an
improvement certainly, but not as signiﬁcant an improvement as
in other periods. During the second sub-period, 2006–2010,employment fell by 28.3%, but fatalities fell by an even greater rate
of 37.5%. As a matter of record it should be noted that a longer time
horizon yields a brighter picture since from 1992 to 2010 fatalities
fell by nearly 16% while employment increased by nearly 20%.
(Employment: BLS, 2012; Fatalities; BLS, 2012a).
Since 1992 the frequency of work-related fatal events for all
industries fell for three of the four most prominent fatality catego-
ries: highway incidents, homicides, and struck by object. The one
major category running counter to this trend was ‘‘falls’’. For the
1992–2010 period falls experienced an increase in the absolute
number of fatalities (from 600 to 635) and had the least reduction
in relative terms compared to the peak observations for the period
(25% versus 42% for the other three categories). This suggests
examination of the fatal fall phenomena as an important area of
investigation if progress in reducing fatal work events is to be
achieved.
For 2010 the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 774 fatalities in
construction relative to 4206 reported for the entire private sector.
This ranked ‘‘construction’’ as number one in fatalities and fourth
in terms of fatal injury rates among the ﬁfteen industrial sectors
identiﬁed. All falls accounted for about 14% of worker deaths in
2010 with 18% of that total represented by falls from roofs. When
examined by occupation, 57 deaths involved roofers and the fatal-
ity rate was 32.4 per 100,000. Taking into account the 2010 ‘‘all
industry’’ rate of 3.8 per 100,000 full-time workers contrasted to
9.8 for construction, rooﬁng was nearly nine times as risky as the
average occupation and 3.3 times as risky as the average construc-
tion trade. (BLS, 2011).
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industry requires an understanding of the nature of the industry
itself. Common characteristics of the industry are:
(1) Industry structure
a. Typically small ﬁrms. Often 10 or fewer employees.
b. Nonunion.
c. Low capital requirements. May be limited to a truck, lad-
ders and, at best, minimal safety gear.
d. Transient nature. Because of low capital requirements
and, perhaps legal issues, entry and exit is easy. Most
ﬁrms are sole proprietorships.
e. No specialized managerial skill.
(2) Environment
a. Workplace is hazardous. The work environment is ele-
vated, usually sloped, and the surface is often slippery.
b. Movement is essential, with or without assistance gear.
c. Weather often makes for a hostile environment.
(3) Workforce
a. Skill level is low. Not generally regarded as a ‘‘skilled
trade’’ and little or no formal training is provided.
b. The work tends to be seasonal. It may be difﬁcult for an
individual to commit to the rooﬁng industry because
continuous employment may not be possible.
c. Relatively high proportion of foreign-born workers. This
has been shown to give rise to communication problems
when dealing with safety issues.
As a result of all of these factors, the residential rooﬁng industry
is characterized by a high level of hazard coupled with an environ-
ment which may not be conducive to mitigation activities on the
part of either management or labor.2. Materials and methods
In late 2011 at the request of OSHA, the Construction Industry
Research and Policy Center at the University of Tennessee, Knox-
ville (CIRPC) undertook a study of the circumstances surrounding
residential rooﬁng fatalities. The database consisted of 112 case
reports ﬁled by OSHA Compliance Safety and Health Ofﬁcers
(CSHO’s) following a detailed investigation of each fatal event.
The reports were broadly representative of the nation as a whole
and included more than 90% of the events during the period of
2005–1010. Included were events involving both single family
(83) and multi-family housing (29). Cases were reviewed based
on standard safety guidelines in effect during the construction time
period. Particular attention was paid to a number of options which
could be utilized to provide a degree of protection for roofers. Here
are some of the alternatives:
(1) For a low slope roof (4/12 or less incline)
 A warning line consisting of a ﬂagged rope or wire at
least 6 feet (1.8 m) from the edge and 34–39 inches
(0.8–1.0 m) high.
 A safety monitor. He/she must be a competent (i.e.,
trained and authorized) person usually with no other
duties than assuring the safety of the worker(s).(2) For higher-slope roofs1 In this document the term ‘‘Hispanic’’ refers to a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto
Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin regardless of race.
As of 2012 some 24.4% of the construction industry workforce was classiﬁed as
Hispanic. Slide guards, if the eave is no more than 25 feet (7.6 m)
from the ground and the slope is less than or equal to
8/12. Slide guards are boards placed parallel to the eave
and held in place by brackets.
 Personal fall arrest system. This consists of a harness
worn by the roofer and attached to a lanyard which is
properly anchored to the roof.In 1999 OSHA issued ‘‘Interim Fall Protection Compliance
Guidelines for Residential Construction’’ which tended to relax
the fall protection standards established in the regular OSHA stan-
dards. It is these interim standards which were in place during the
2005–2010 period under investigation.
A complete picture of the applicable regulations can be seen in
Fig. 1. As shown, the interim guidelines only came into force in sit-
uations where the eave height was 25 feet (7.6 m) or less. If that
criterion was met, alternate approaches to meeting the standards
were triggered depending on the slope of the roof.
In December of 2010 OSHA cancelled the interim guidelines in
effect since 1999 and established new enforcement policies based
on the residential construction standards found in the Code of
Federal Regulations (See 29 CFR Part 1926 Subpart M – Fall Protec-
tion). Fig. 2 illustrates the new regulations which were promul-
gated in June of 2011. It is clear that the new regulations are
more stringent than the interim regulations: they apply to activity
6 feet (1.8 m) or more above lower levels and, except in unusual
cases, require the use of guardrails, safety nets, or personal fall
arrest systems. As such, our analysis of the cases studied here
may serve at some future time as a benchmark to measure the
effect of the changes in standards mandated by the new policy.3. Results
3.1. Characteristics of the study population and events
A snapshot of the industry that emerges from these case reports
buttresses the characterization of the industry described earlier:
(1) The operating environment is hazardous. Sixty percent of
the known slope cases involved a roof slope of 3/12 or
greater and in 20% of these cases the slope exceeded 8/12.
(2) In nearly 75% of the cases, the fall distance exceeded 15 feet
(4.6 m).
(3) In nearly 50% of the fatalities, employees were reported to be
untrained and more than 10% had less than four weeks
experience.
(4) The Hispanic1 element in the study population approached
37% as compared to a 2012 Hispanic construction industry
workforce of nearly 25%.
Roof slope and eave height are important factors in the applica-
tion of rooﬁng standards. While roof slope characteristics were not
reported in about 25% of the cases, some 60% of the fatalities were
identiﬁed as involving roofs of 8/12 slope or less. Of the 83 cases
where roof slope was recorded, information was also available on
eave height. For low slope roofs (<4/12), the largest number of fatal-
ities (14) occurred at eaves of 7–15 feet (2.1–4.6 m), 9 cases were
reported at 16–25 feet (4.9–7.6 m), and 6 recorded at 36 feet (11 m)
or more, thus accounting for 29 of the 30 cases with known eave
height. In the intermediate slope category (4/12–8/12) the eaves
tended to be somewhat higher with 21 cases reporting 16–25 foot
(4.9–7.6 m) eaves, and 7 reporting 26–35 foot (7.9–10.7 m) eaves,
thusaccounting for28of the33 fatality caseswithknowneaveheight.
Forhighsloperoofs (>8/12), thedistributionwassimilar to that for the
intermediate category,with 9 of the 14 caseswith known eaveheight
reporting a 16–25 foot (4.9–7.6 m) range. Overall, of the known eave
cases, 28%of the fatalitieswere15 feet (4.6 m)or less, 46%were in the
Fig. 1. Intern fall protection guidelines for residential rooﬁng.
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(7.6 m) or greater.
The type of or lack of fall protection used by employees was
documented in 106 of the 112 cases examined, and is reported in
Table 1. In the 33 low slope cases, there was no indication of
the proper use of any fall protection. In the intermediate slope
category (4/12–8/12) involving 34 cases there was only one docu-
mented case of appropriate use of fall protection (slide guards). Of
the 25 high slope cases, there was apparently greater use of safety
equipment, with only 5 cases reporting no attempt to use fall pro-
tection. However, in 10 of the 25 cases, the use was deemed
‘‘improper’’. For the unknown slope category, only one of the
30 entries reﬂected the possible proper use of fall protection –
the use of a personal fall arrest system.
Little information could be gleaned from the CSHO reports
relative to the rooﬁng experience of the workers. Experience was
only reported for 24 cases. In 9 of these cases, experience was less
than onemonth; in another 5 cases it was fromonemonth to a year;
and in only 10 cases did experience amount to one year ormore. Par-
ticularly notable is the fact that in 4 of the 24 cases for which infor-
mation was available, workers had three or fewer days’ experience.
As will be noted below, lack of training was cited 55 times (out of
249) as a contributing factor in rooﬁng fatalities.
Fourteen factorswere identiﬁedas contributing factors in the112
fatality cases. In some cases more than one factor may have been
involved, leading to a total of 249 contributing observations as listed
in Table 2. Aside from lack of trainingmentioned above, a number of
these factors suchas lost balance/slip/trip (28%of observations), lackof concentration (13% of observations) and victimmisjudged edge of
roof (10%of observations)may, at least inpart relate tohuman factor
issues rather than purely physical issues associated with a some-
what hostile rooﬁng environment; although the presence of safe-
guards might well have mitigated many of these factors (Kelso
et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2012). Also of note is the absence of a com-
petent person (8% of observations). Somewhat surprisingly, given
the ethnicity of the labor force, a language barrier was cited in only
10 cases (4%) cases as a contributing factor since known Hispanic
fatalities amounted to 41 (37%) of the 112 reported fatalities.
In each fatality investigation, CSHO’s were asked to evaluate
employer safety and health plans. The rating values were 3 (above
average), 2 (average), 1 (inadequate), 0 (non-existent), or
unknown. As shown in Table 3, plans were rated on seven dimen-
sions. If in all 112 cases, all seven aspects of the safety plan were
evaluated, 784 individual ratings would be available. In fact, there
were no observations for 509 (65%) of the rating items. Of the
remaining 275 items, none was ranked above average, 35 (13%)
were rated average, 125 (45%) were categorized as inadequate,
and 115 (42%) were said to be nonexistent. Combining the ‘‘nonex-
istent’’ and ‘‘unknown’’ categories, 78% of the remaining CSHO
evaluations (125/160) showed only inadequate safety and health
plans. This observation is further supported by calculated mean
ratings, when ratings for each of the seven items were provided,
from 0.57 (for written safety and health plan) to 0.95 (for commu-
nication to employees). These data suggest that in addition to
lacking fall protection and training, failure to properly plan may
be a signiﬁcant factor in residential fall fatalities.
Fig. 2. Fall protection guidelines for residential rooﬁng.
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Within our study, 331 citations were issued for violations of
federal standards. One of these, a section 1926.552 violation relat-
ing to hoists, elevators and conveyors with a penalty assessment of
$63,000, was excluded during data analysis as an outlier. The other
330 violations were grouped into four broad classiﬁcations based
on the breakdown of regulatory categories:
 falls
 scaffolds
 ladders
 miscellaneous
Table 4 shows the nature and frequency of the standards vio-
lated. Note that the 15 individual types of citations covered 320
of the 330 citations considered (97%).More than half (53%) of the citations were issued in the ‘‘Falls’’
category with emphasis on the failed duty to have fall protection
(93 cases) and the failure to provide the requisite fall training
(70 cases). The fact that only 83% of the cases (93/112) were cited
under the general duty provision of the falls standard may be
explained by the issuance of 26 citations under the broader ‘‘gen-
eral duty to provide a safe workplace’’ standard.
The second most frequent group of standards violated related to
scaffolds – amounting to 13.3% of the total. Ladder issues were the
third major category of citations with 7.3% of the observations. The
‘‘Miscellaneous’’ category involved ﬁve sub-categories and
accounted for 23.3% of the citations.
Table 5 reports the average ﬁnalized penalty for each of the ﬁfteen
sub-categories and the four major categories of penalties. Note that
the average penalty of $2251 in the ‘‘Falls’’ category is almost twice
the average for the penalties in the ‘‘Scaffold’’ category and greater
by an even larger margin than the other two major categories.
Table 1
Fall protection usage.
Fall protection type Slope Total
<4/
12
4/12–8/
12
>8/
12+
Unknown
Slide guards 0 1 3 0 4
Roof bracket 0 0 2 0 2
Improper slide guard 0 5 3 1 9
Guard rails 0 0 0 0 0
Nets 0 0 0 0 0
Personal fall arrest 0 0 1 1 2
Warning line 0 0 0 0 0
Safety monitor 0 0 0 0 0
No fall protection used 29 22 5 25 81
Fall protection failed 0 0 2 0 2
Installing fall protection 0 1 2 0 3
Improperly used 2 3 7 1 13
Fall protection not
mentioned
2 2 0 2 6
Total 33 34 25 30 122
In 10 cases there were multiple items reported.
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failure to meet the general duty to provide fall protection
(1926.501) provided the largest average ﬁne of $2758. The assess-
ments in the remaining fourteen categories ranged from $0
(cases involving Scaffolds-Speciﬁc) to $1562 (cases involving
Falls-Training).
Examination of the penalties assigned for the violations noted
by the CSHO’s in their review of residential rooﬁng fatalities sug-
gest a question: In dollar terms, what was the impact of rooﬁng
fatality penalty assessments on an individual employer? As an
approximation, consider the fact that there were 330 violationsTable 2
Factors contributing to rooﬁng fatalities.
Factors Slope
<4/12 4/12–8/12
No competent person 8 7.1% 9
Lack of concentration 14 12.5% 10
Lack of training 17 15.2% 21
Lost balance/slip/trip 22 19.6% 23
Unexpected movement of surface 1 0.9% 0
Language barrier 1 0.9% 5
Unguarded opening 2 1.8% 1
Fell through material over opening 3 2.7% 1
Victim misjudged edge of roof 13 11.6% 5
Equipment failure 1 0.9% 0
Drugs/alcohol 2 1.8% 0
Weather 0 0.0% 3
Struck by object 1 0.9% 0
Employee misconduct 0 0.0% 0
Total 85 75.9% 78
Table 3
Safety and health plan ratings.
Safety and health sections Above average (3) Average (2)
Written S & H Plan 0 8
Communication to employees 0 5
Enforcement 0 4
Safety training program 0 6
Heath training program 0 4
Accident investigation program 0 5
Preventative action taken 0 3
Total 0 35noted for the 111 cases under consideration. This is an average of
2.97 violations per investigation. Based on the average penalty
assessed for the 201 levies ﬁnalized, this amounts to an overall
average of $4930 per case.
It may also be of interest to examine the frequency distribution
of the ﬁnal penalties assessed. Of the 111 cases examined, 57
resulted in determination of ﬁnal penalties. Although not shown
in speciﬁc detail, the most frequent penalty, the modal value,
was between $6000 and $6999. The range was from $0, assessed
in six cases, to $18625 in one case. Considering all 57 cases, the
median penalty was $4750 which is similar to the mean value of
$4930 per case as discussed above. The total Gross Base Penalty
initially assessed in these 57 cases amounted to $997,500, while
the total ﬁnal penalty was 21.3% of the initial assessment, or
$212,334. While these 57 cases involve just over half of the 111
cases studied, there is no reason to assume that they are not repre-
sentative. It may be assumed that a number of ameliorating factors
must be operative to produce this result. In any case, it is clear that
the initial perception of the seriousness of a violation is, on the
average, mitigated to a great extent.
4. Discussion
4.1. The impact of old and new OSHA standards
Do these data shed any light on the anticipated beneﬁt from the
new 2011 standards? Recall that our analyses reﬂect an interim
standard regimen depicted in Fig. 1. In summary, this experience
shows:
(1) In most of the 112 incidents, fall protection was not used at
all, or used incorrectly.Total
>8/12 Unknown
8.0% 2 1.8% 2 1.8% 21
8.9% 5 4.5% 4 3.6% 33
18.8% 7 6.3% 10 8.9% 55
20.5% 10 8.9% 15 13.4% 70
0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.9% 2
4.5% 2 1.8% 2 1.8% 10
0.9% 0 0.0% 4 3.6% 7
0.9% 0 0.0% 4 3.6% 8
4.5% 1 0.9% 5 4.5% 24
0.0% 1 0.9% 1 0.9% 3
0.0% 1 0.9% 1 0.9% 4
2.7% 4 3.6% 2 1.8% 9
0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1
0.0% 1 0.9% 1 0.9% 2
69.6% 34 30.4% 52 46.4% 249
Inadequate (1) Nonexistent (0) Unknown Average rating
10 28 66 0.57
25 7 75 0.95
26 14 68 0.77
24 14 68 0.82
13 19 76 0.58
10 19 78 0.59
17 14 78 0.68
125 115 509
Table 4
Top ﬁfteen OSHA standards violated in residential construction cases studied: 2005–
2010.
Category Number of
citations
%
Distribution
Falls
1926.501 Falls – general duty 93
.502 Falls – practice 12
.503 Falls – training 70
Sub-total 175 52.9%
Scaffolds
1926.451 Scaffolds – general 31
.452 Scaffolds – speciﬁc 4
.453 Aerial lifts 3
.454 Training 6
Sub-total 44 13.3%
Ladders
1926.1051 Ladders – general 1
.1052 Stairways 5
.1053 Ladders 18
Sub-total 24 7.3%
Miscellaneous
1926.20 General safety 26
1904.39 Reporting 18
1910.12 Adoption of
standards
17
1926.50 Medical services 8
1926.106 Proximity to water 8
Sub-total 77 23.3%
Other 10 3.0%
Grand total 330 100%
Table 5
Average ﬁnal penalties imposed for top ﬁfteen OSHA standards violated in residential con
Category Number of citations
Falls
1926.501 Falls – general duty 68
.502 Falls – practice 6
.503 Falls – training 39
Sub-total 113
Scaffolds
1926.451 Scaffolds – general 18
.452 Scaffolds – speciﬁc 0
.453 Aerial lifts 3
.454 Training 3
Sub-total 24
Ladders
1926.1051 Ladders – general 1
.1052 Stairways 2
.1053 Ladders 12
Sub-total 15
Miscellaneous
1926.20 General safety 18
1904.39 Reporting 12
1910.12 Adoption of standards 10
1926.50 Medical services 6
1926.106 Proximity to water 3
Sub-total 49
Grand total 201
Final penalties established on only 201 of the 330 citations reported in Table 4.
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all or almost all of the 41 individuals killed would have lived
had they been using conventional PPE appropriately. In 15 of
the 41 cases, the use of the interim standards would not
have changed the outcome. For example, if the victim
walked backward off the rake edge of the roof, slide guards
would not have prevented the event.
(3) The employees or employers did not understand and/or
intentionally failed to use appropriate fall protection in the
residential setting.
(4) There appears to have been a serious lack of adequate train-
ing for this roofer workforce.
(5) Planning was minimal in the residential setting.
Based on these observations it seems unlikely that the imple-
mentation of new, more rigorous standards will, alone, have a ben-
eﬁcial effect.
In a similar but unpublished study of 128 case ﬁles for the three
year period 1997–1999, CIRPC found that 96% of the time either no
fall protection was provided (111 cases) or was available but not
used (12 cases). Also, in the 90 ﬁles where it was possible to estab-
lish the CSHO’s evaluation of training programs, 69 (77%) were
deemed non-existent or unacceptable. The same study also
showed that in 72 (56%) of the cases, employment duration was
less than three months (CIRPC, 2003).
In 2000, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) published a study of fatal falls in the workplace
(NIOSH, 2000). Included in the report were 90 Fatality Assessment
and Control Evaluation (FACE) reports from 1982 to 1997. Similar
in some ways to the CSHO reports evaluated in our current study,
10 of these reports dealt with residential rooﬁng. It may be inter-
esting to compare some of the FACE ﬁndings with those presentedstruction cases studied: 2005–2010.
Average ﬁnal penalty Weighted average by major category
$2758
992
1562
$2251
1286
0
747
783
1156
875
375
1000
908
903
1108
156
467
1350
775
$1660
268 J.R. Moore, J.P. Wagner / Safety Science 70 (2014) 262–269here. First, none of the 10 FACE reports documented appropriate
use of fall protection, which is similar to our ﬁndings. Secondly,
in 7 of the 10 cases it was reported that training had been given
 a ﬁnding somewhat at odds with our results. It should be noted,
however, that the ﬁrms covered in the FACE reports tended to be
larger than those in our 112 cases, averaging more than 40 employ-
ees per case (with a range of from 3 to 205 employees). The 3 cases
reporting inadequate training all reported 15 or fewer employees,
while the 7 reporting training had 15 or more employees. In gen-
eral, then, it seems safe to say that the information in the older res-
idential rooﬁng FACE reports is in agreement with our results on
more recent OSHA fatality reports.
Recently Dong et al. (2013) undertook a longitudinal study of
fatal roof falls based on secondary sources for the period 1992–
2009. Their major ﬁndings were that 2007–2009 reductions in
fatalities were, to a large extent, a result of a decline in construc-
tion activity, that among construction workers roof fatalities were
disproportionally high, and that a higher rate of fatalities was
found among younger workers and Hispanics. In contrast to the
Dong et al. study, ours is based on primary 2005–2010 data on
residential fatalities and provides additional detail about the prac-
tices and problems involved in this segment of the construction
industry. The conclusions reached by Dong et al., however, differ
little from our conclusions.
Our analysis of residential falls presents only a partial picture of
the ‘‘falls’’ problem. In addition to examining other fall environ-
ments, a fuller picture would also account for the impact of falls
on the much more prevalent categories of ‘‘injuries’’. While injury
data was absent from our underlying data set, BLS reported that for
construction as a whole, injuries involving days away from work,
job transfers or restrictions were fourteen times more likely
to occur than a fatality (BLS, 2010). Recognition of this adds
emphasis to the need to improve the residential rooﬁng work
environment.
4.2. Financial penalties as a deterrent
It is clear that in many of the fatality cases reported for our
study period little or no attempt was made by the employer to
follow even the relaxed interim standards. Given the nature of
the industry and the potential impact of regulatory sanctions, it
is easy to see why rooﬁng fatalities continue, at least for business
reasons. The typical employer with perhaps three or four unskilled
employees is unlikely to consider adoption of the requisite safety
measures when considering the costs involved. Those costs would
include a perceived reduction in productivity, the incremental out-
of-pocket cost of compliance, and the possible cost of a ﬁne for fail-
ure to adhere to the guidelines. Out-of-pocket cost, however, is
unlikely to loom large since items like slide guards and harnesses
are low-cost and durable and can be spread over many jobs for
perhaps many years. Similarly, potential ﬁnancial penalties are
unlikely to enter into the employers’ beneﬁt/cost calculations for
at least two reasons: ﬁrst, the risk of a fatality on a given job while
positive is extremely low; secondly, the ﬁnancial penalties associ-
ated with a fatality may be unknown in the industry. But even if
known, based on our actual average penalty value of less than
$5,000, the prospect of such an outcome would be unlikely to
overcome the perceived negative productivity factor in a highly
competitive environment.
One approach to altering the beneﬁt/cost equation might be
to substantially increase the size of penalties and publicize this
information to the industry. Over time such a policy might
result in forcing some smaller, marginal ﬁrms from the ﬁeld
leaving larger, better capitalized ﬁrms capable of taking positive
steps to ameliorate safety issues rather than absorbing the
penalty.Since the completion of our study period, OSHA has announced
enhancements to its penalty policies. The changes which were
announced to go into effect in October of 2010 resulted from
an agency study of penalties which concluded that they were
too low ‘‘to have an adequate deterrent effect’’ (OSHA, 2010). Gen-
erally speaking the new penalty structure nearly doubles the for-
mer gravity-based penalties, but adjustments can still have a
major impact on the ﬁnal assessment. Comparison of the results
over the next few years with those presented here will prove
interesting.
In can be hoped that a combination of enhanced standards and
increased penalties will have a salutary effect in reducing fatal and
non-fatal residential rooﬁng injuries.4.3. Campaign to prevent falls in construction
An alternate approach is currently being undertaken by a con-
sortium of agencies to more generally increase awareness of the
problem of falls in general. This consortium consisting of a number
of government, industry, labor and academic organizations is
engaged in a multifaceted campaign to alert both management
and labor on the risks of falls and ways to improve worker safety
(http://stopconstructionfalls.com/). Known as the ‘‘Campaign to
Prevent Falls in Construction’’, this national effort is focused on
three issues:
planning ahead for safety,
providing the necessary equipment, and
training workers in the proper use of the appropriate equip-
ment in a safe manner.
The importance of these matters is cast in the results of residen-
tial roof falls analysis presented here. With regard to planning (see
Table 3), CSHO’s primarily reported ratings of ‘‘non-existent’’ to
‘‘inadequate’’. Inexperience and a lack of training were prominent.
While not addressed directly in this study, it is likely that provid-
ing necessary safety equipment may be the easiest objective to
achieve. As shown in Fig. 2, the requisite safety equipment
is ‘‘low-tech’’, low-cost, and durable and should, therefore, place
little ﬁnancial burden on the residential rooﬁng sector.
Overall, it would seem that reliance on penalty awareness as a
deterrent may only have limited success in improving fall safety.
On the other hand, a broad-based educational initiative like the
Stop Falls campaign may have the greatest potential for success,
oriented as it is towards two of the most problematic areas of roof-
ing behavior identiﬁed in this study: lack of training and failure to
know and/or follow safety standards.5. Conclusion
Residential rooﬁng is more than three times as risky (in terms of
fatalities) as the average construction trade. The study reported
here based on a detailed analysis of 112 fatality reports ﬁled by
OSHA inspectors during the period of 2005–2010, attempts to
identify the reasons for the high mortality rate and look at areas
for remediation.
Perhaps as a function of the underlying nature of residential
rooﬁng it was found that there was little or no adherence to the
OSHA safety standards in effect. Fall protection measures were
seldom in evidence, the workforce received little or no training,
and planning by the employer tended to be deemed inadequate
or nonexistent.
As a result of the OSHA fatality investigations, over 300 viola-
tions of federal standards were observed resulting in the assess-
ment of an average penalty of $4930. It was noted, however, that
J.R. Moore, J.P. Wagner / Safety Science 70 (2014) 262–269 269this ﬁnal penalty was only slightly more than 20% of the initial
assessment.
New and more stringent regulations were promulgated by
OSHA in 2011 along with an announced intention to increase the
size of penalties. Coupled with the nationwide ‘‘Campaign to Pre-
vent Falls in Construction’’ with its emphasis on proper equipment
and two of the areas of industry weakness observed in this study,
planning and training, perhaps a signiﬁcant impact will be
observed.
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